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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision on June 9, 2011. Pursuant to 
Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a), and in accordance with Rules 45 and 46 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court has jurisdiction to review the 
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. The decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals is reported at Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2011 UT App 183, 
257 P.3d 1049, a copy of which is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court 
granted Appellants' Petition for Writ of Certiorari as to the following issue: 
Whether the court of appeals erred in construing the Limitations on 
Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-4-201, et seq., to permit releases of liability for ordinary 
negligence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
not that of the district court. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11, 103 P.3d 699. 
The Court reviews the Court of Appeals' decision for correctness, "giving no 
deference to its conclusions of law." State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, Tf 8, 240 P.3d 
780. Because the issue before the Court is one of statutory interpretation, the 
Court conducts its own review for correctness. See State v. Anderson, 2009 UT 13, 
T}6,203P.3d990. 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities ("Equine Act"), 
Utah Code Ann. §§78B-4-201 to 78B-4-203 (formerly §§ 78-27b-101 to 78-27b-
103): 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201. Definitions; 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202. Equine and livestock activity liability 
limitations; 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-203. Signs to be posted listing inherent risks 
and liability limitations.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case. 
On August 1, 2007, Plaintiff Lisa Penunuri (hereinafter "Penunuri") and two 
friends took part in a horseback ride operated by Defendant Rocky Mountain 
Outfitters. The ride covered areas in and around the Sundance Resort. Prior to 
embarking on the ride, Penunuri was presented with a Horseback Riding Release 
(hereinafter "Release"). The Release explains that horseback riding involves 
"significant risk of serious personal injury" and goes on to describe some of those 
risks. The Release also explains there are certain "inherent risks" associated with 
horseback ridings for which the Defendants (collectively "Sundance") cannot be 
1A copy of the Equine Act, Utah Code Ann. §§78B-4-201 to 78B-4-203, is 
attached hereto as Addendum B. 
2 
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held liable. Penunuri signed the Release and indicated that she had read, 
understood and voluntarily agreed to the same. 
During the ride, Penunuri fell from her horse and was injured. She alleges 
that she fell when her horse accelerated unexpectedly to catch up with the horse in 
front of her. 
Penunuri, along with her husband, Barry Siegwart, filed suit against 
Sundance for personal injuries. In a motion for partial summary judgment, 
Penunuri sought to have the trial court declare the Release void under the Equine 
Act and the purported public policy underlying the same. The trial court denied 
Penunuri's motion and dismissed her ordinary negligence-based claims as a matter 
of law. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Penunuri and her husband filed this lawsuit against Sundance on January 3, 
2008. (R. 14.) Sundance filed its Answer on March 5, 2008. (R. 31.) On 
September 22, 2009, Penunuri moved for partial summary judgment and for 
declaratory relief. (R. 132, R. 143.) After briefing on the motion was complete, the 
trial court heard oral argument on January 19, 2010. (R. 243.) The trial court 
denied Penunuri's motion. (R. 247.) Finding the Release valid and enforceable, 
the trial court dismissed Penunuri's ordinary negligence-based claims with 
prejudice and on the merits, leaving only her claim for gross negligence. (R. 247.) 
3 
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C. Disposition of the Lower Courts. 
On.March 30, 2010, the trial court entered an order denying Penunuri's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and dismissed ordinary negligence-based 
claims against Sundance as a matter of law. (R. 247.) 
On June 9, 2011, a unanimous panel of the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed 
the trial court's ruling. See Penunuri, 2011 UT App 183, 257 P.3d 1049. 
On July 5, 2011, Penunuri filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. On October 
20,2011, this Court granted her Petition. See Penunuri v. Sundance, 263 P.3d 390 
(Utah 2011). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On August 1, 2007, Penunuri and two friends went to Sundance for a 
guided horseback ride. (R. 250.) 
2. Prior to the ride, Penunuri signed a Release, which reads, in relevant 
part: 
SUNDANCE HORSEBACK RIDING RELEASE 
* * * 
RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT - READ CAREFULLY 
BEFORE SIGNING 
I, the undersigned, and if I am a person under 18 years of age, my 
parents and I (hereafter "Rider") understand that horseback riding, 
sleigh riding or horse drawn wagons (collectively "Horseback 
Riding") involve SIGNIFICANT RISK OF SERIOUS PERSONAL 
INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR EVEN DEATH. The risks 
4 
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include NATURAL, MAN-MADE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONDITIONS AND INHERENT RISKS, including changing 
weather, mud, rocks, variations in steepness, terrain, natural and 
man-made obstacles, equipment failure and the negligence of others. 
"Inherent risk" with regard to equine or livestock activities means those 
dangers or conditions which are an integral part of equine or livestock 
activities, which may include: (a) the propensity of the animal to behave 
in ways that may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or around 
them; (b) the unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside 
stimulation such as sounds, sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects, 
persons, or other animals; (c) collisions with other animals or objects; or 
(d) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may 
contribute to injury to the participant or others, such as failing to 
maintain control over the animal or not acting within his or her ability. 
Sundance shall have no liability for inherent risks. 
In consideration of participation in the Horseback Riding and use 
of SUNDANCE'S facilities, I agree to the following: 
1. I expressly agree to assume all risks of personal injury, falls, 
accidents, and/or property damage, including those resulting from 
any negligence of Sundance Partners Ltd., Sundance Holding 
LLC, Sundance Development Corporation, Sundance Institute, 
Inc., Robert Redford, Redford 1970 Trust, Rocky Mountain 
Outfitters, L.C., their agents, employees, property owners, and 
affiliated companies (herein collectively "SUNDANCE"). 
2. Release & Indemnity. To the fullest extent allowed by law, I 
agree to forever release SUNDANCE from any and all claims for 
injuries, losses, and damages resulting in any way from "Horseback 
Riding" use of Sundance facilities, SUNDANCE'S negligence. My 
release includes all claims regarding the design, maintenance, 
manufacture, instructions, or conditions of the Horseback Riding area, 
course, structures or equipment utilized in the Horseback Riding, 
express or implied warranties, product liability and the negligence of 
SUNDANCE. To the fullest extent allowed by law, I agree to 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
indemnify and hold SUNDANCE harmless from all claims, damages 
or injuries in any way related to my participation in Horseback Riding 
or use of any facilities at SUNDANCE, including breach of this 
Release, and will reimburse SUNDANCE'S attorneys' fees and costs, 
even if SUNDANCE was negligent. 
* * * 
7. I HAVE READ, UNDERSTOOD AND VOLUNTARILY 
SIGNED THIS RELEASE OF LIABILITY. 
Signature of Rider: /s/ Lisa Penunuri Date 8/1/07 
(R. 250.) (emphasis original). 
3. Penunuri was forty-eight years old when she executed the Release. 
(R. 249.) 
4. Penunuri signed the Release prior to the horseback ride and testified 
that she did so voluntarily. (R. 182, L. Penunuri Dep., p. 129.)2 
5. Penunuri testified that at no time did she ask for any clarification 
regarding any of the language in the Release. (R. 182, L. Penunuri Dep., p. 130.) 
6. According to Penunuri, during the ride, the horse in front of hers 
would occasionally stop to graze, causing some separation between her and the rest 
2
 This was not Penunuri's first experience signing a release. During her deposition, 
she testified, "[a]ll these releases, they all say the standard thing. Like I've been — 
what is it — when we went rock climbing at the rock climbing gym, they have you 
sign something similar, and you know, they all say you can die, so it's pretty 
standard." (R. 182, L. Penunuri Dep., p. 123.) In addition, Penunuri testified that 
shortly before the accident, she took two horseback riding lessons at an arena near 
her home in Phoenix, Arizona where she also executed a release. (R. 182, L. 
Penunuri Dep., pp. 64-65, 129.) 
6 
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of the group. (R. 182, L. Penunuri Dep., p. 112.) With respect to her fall, 
Penunuri testified: 
. . . my horse was stopped behind [Haley's horse], and my 
horse started going, and it was - - it was a rougher ride than I 
remember having had before, other than, you know, with other 
grazing episodes my horse would, you know, kind of giddyup 
a little faster than it had been going, because Haley's horse 
would start up and then mine would start up, too, and then 
would slow down. And this particular incident, it seemed 
even rougher than, you know, the giddyup that I had gotten in 
other stops. And then I don't remember anything until I was 
on the ground. 
(R. 182, L. Penunuri Dep., pp. 114-15.) 
7 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Penunuri asserts that the Release she signed prior to embarking on the trail 
ride at Sundance is invalid and unenforceable. Relying on the Equine Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78B-4-201 to -203, Penunuri argues that the Release violates the 
plain language and public policy of the Act. 
As a general rule, Utah recognizes and upholds the rights of individuals to 
limit their ability to recover in tort for damages caused by the ordinary negligence 
of others. Despite Penunuri's assertion to the contrary, nothing in the plain 
language of the Equine Act prohibits the use of a release between equine activity 
sponsors and participants, or reveals a public policy against the same. In fact, the 
plain language of the Equine Act expressly contemplates and authorizes the use of 
releases by equine sponsors. 
Patterning her arguments and analysis against the enforcement of the 
Release she signed after those set forth in the case Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 
2007 UT 96, 175 P.3d 560, where a ski release was declared void against the 
public policy of the Inherent Risks of Skiing Act ("Skiing Act"), Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78B-4-401 to -404 (formerly 78-27-51 to -54), Penunuri attempts to paint the 
Equine Act and the Skiing Act as being one and the same. While Sundance does 
not dispute there being some similarities between the Equine Act and the Skiing 
Act, there are key distinctions between them, both in form and in substance. 
8 
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In order for the Release to be void based on public policy, Penunuri must 
make a showing free from doubt that the Release is against public policy. Because 
Penunuri has failed to make such a showing, the decision of the Court of Appeals 
should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE EQUINE ACT DOES 
NOT INVALIDATE THE RELEASE SIGNED BY PENUNURI. 
When construing a statute, this Court "looks first to the plain meaning of the 
words used and their statutory context." Kimball Condos. Owners Ass 'n v. County 
Bd. of Equalization, 943 P.2d 642, 648 (Utah 1997). It is a fundamental rule of 
statutory construction that statutes are to be construed according to their plain 
language. See O'Keefe v. Retirement Bd.y 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998). See 
also State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, \ 25, 4 P.3d 795 ("Our primary goal in 
interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the 
plain language, in light of the purposes the statute was meant to achieve.") 
Moreover, the "terms of a statute are to be interpreted as a comprehensive whole 
and not in a piecemeal fashion." Bus. Aviation ofS.D., Inc. v. Medivest, Inc., 882 
P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1994). 
Penunuri argues that section 202 of the Equine Act "provides that the 
sponsor [of an equine activity] is not to be held liable for inherent risks associated 
with equine activity [sic] yet must be held liable for its acts or omissions of 
9 
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negligence." (Appellants' Brf, p. 12) (emphasis added). She contends that 
because the protections of section 202 apply only to "inherent risks" and expressly 
provides no protection against ordinary negligence, section 202 prohibits by 
implication an equine sponsor from utilizing a release to protect against claims of 
ordinary negligence. 
Section 202 of the Equine Act states, in relevant part: 
(1) It shall be presumed that participants in equine or livestock 
activities are aware of and understand that there are inherent risks 
associated with these activities. 
(2) An equine activity sponsor , equine professional, livestock activity 
sponsor, or livestock professional is not liable for an injury to or the 
death of a participant due to the inherent risks associated with these 
activities, unless the sponsor or professional: 
(a) (i) provided the equipment or tack; 
(ii) the equipment or tack caused the injury; and 
(iii) the equipment failure was due to the sponsor's or 
professional's negligence; 
(b) failed to make reasonable efforts to determine whether the 
equine or livestock could behave in a manner consistent with 
the activity with the participant; 
(c) owns, leases, rents, or is in legal possession and control of 
land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries 
3
 The term "Equine activity sponsor" is defined to mean "an individual, group, 
governmental entity, club, partnership, or corporation, whether operating for profit 
or as a nonprofit entity, which sponsors, organizes, or provides facilities for an 
equine activity . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201(3). The term "Equine 
activity" is defined to include, among other things, "(f) other equine activities of 
any type including rides, trips, hunts, or informal or spontaneous activities 
sponsored by an equine activity sponsor." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201(2). 
10 
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because of a dangerous condition which was known to or 
should have been known to the sponsor or professional and for 
which signs have not been conspicuously posted; 
(d) (i) commits an act or omission that constitutes negligence, 
gross negligence, or willful or wanton disregard for the safety 
of the participant; and 
(ii) that act or omission causes the injury; or 
(e) intentionally injures or causes the injury to the participant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202(2) (emphasis added). 
Using clear and unambiguous language, the Act provides that an equine 
activity sponsor cannot be liable for the "inherent risks" associated with equine 
activities, "unless" the sponsor (a) negligently provided faulty equipment or tack 
that causes injury; (b) failed to make reasonable efforts regarding equine selection; 
(c) failed to post signs for known dangerous conditions; (d) committed an act or 
omission constituting negligence, gross negligence, or willM or wanton disregard 
for the safety of the participant, or (e) intentionally caused injury to the participant. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202(2). While arguably expressed as exceptions to 
the rule protecting equine sponsors from liability for "inherent risks," none of these 
circumstances actually involve "inherent risks." The Act defines "inherent risk" as 
follows: 
[W]ith regard to equine or livestock activities [inherent risk] means 
those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of equine or 
livestock activities, which may include: 
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(a) the propensity of the animal to behave in ways that may result in 
injury, harm, or death to persons on or around them; 
(b) the unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside stimulation 
such as sounds, sudden movement, and unfamiliar objections, persons, 
or other animals; 
(c) collisions with other animals or objections; or 
(d) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may 
contribute to injury to the participant or others, such as failing to 
maintain control over the animal or not acting within his or her ability. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201(5). 
Both Sundance and Penunuri agree the Equine Act provides no protection to 
equine activity sponsors for claims of ordinary negligence. The plain language of 
the Act limits its protection only to "inherent risks" and expressly eliminates 
claims of ordinary negligence from its purview. Where the parties disagree is over 
what happens when ordinary negligence is alleged or established. 
Penunuri argues that when ordinary negligence is established, section 202 of 
the Equine Act mandates liability. See Penunuri, 2011 UT App 183, f^ 12. 
According to Penunuri, the Act automatically voids any contractual defenses an 
equine sponsor may have under a release. The problem with this argument is that 
the text of section 202 says nothing that would require the invalidation of an 
otherwise valid and enforceable release. As the Court of Appeals recognized, 
"[t]he principle obstacle to reading section 202 to invalidate pre-injury releases is 
that it does not mention releases." Id. at ^ f 12. 
12 
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This Court has often instructed that it is improper to infer substantive terms 
into the text of a statute. See, e.g., Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 
(Utah 1994) ("A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts are not to 
infer substantive terms into the text [of a statute] that are not already there. Rather, 
the interpretation must be based on the language used, and the court has no power 
to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed.") In this case, the 
Court of Appeals determined that "[r]eading [section 202] to abrogate common law 
defenses, invalidate pre-injury releases, and mandate liability stretches the 
statutory language past its plain meaning." Penunuri, 2011 UT App 183, ^  13. 
A. Had the Legislature intended to abolish the use of 
releases under the Equine Act, it would not have used 
language which expressly contemplates and authorizes their 
use. 
As set forth above, when construing a statute, the primary goal is to evince 
"the true intent and purpose of the Legislature [as expressed through] the plain 
language of the Act." Hall v. Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, \ 15, 24 P.3d 958 
(brackets original). In so doing, Utah courts seek "to render all parts thereof 
relevant and meaningful, and accordingly avoid interpretations that will render 
portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." Id. (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). "[0]ur interpretation of a statute requires that each part or 
section be 'construed in connection with every other part or section so as to 
produce a harmonious whole.'" Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 47, t 9, 234 P.3d 1147 
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(quoting Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ^ 7, 162 P.3d 1099) (additional citations 
omitted)). 
Under section 203 of the Equine Act, equine activity sponsors are to provide 
participants notice of the inherent risks associated with equine activities and states 
that this notice can be provided in a "document or release." Section 203 states, in 
relevant part: 
(1) An equine or livestock activity sponsor shall provide notice to 
participants of the equine or livestock activity that there are inherent 
risks of participating and that the sponsor is not liable for certain of 
those risks. 
(2) Notice shall be provided by: 
(a) posting a sign in a prominent location within the area being 
used for the activity; or 
(b) providing a document or release for the participant, or the 
participant's legal guardian if the participant is a minor, to sign. 
(3) The notice provided by the sign or document shall be sufficient if 
it includes the definition of inherent risk in Section 78B-4-201 and 
states that the sponsor is not liable for those inherent risks. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-203 (emphasis added).4 
4
 Penunuri argues that "[t]he common-sense interpretation of the Notice Section 
203 is that in order for an operator to take advantage of immunity for inherent 
dangers of the Limitations on Liability section 202, the operator must provide 
notice to or warn the participant of the possibility of inherent risks or dangers." 
(Appellants' Brf., p. 14.) While perhaps beyond the scope of this appeal - as there 
is no dispute Sundance fully satisfied the notice requirements of section 203 -
nothing in the plain language of the Equine Act states that the protections against 
liability for "inherent risks" are contingent upon compliance with section 203. 
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The Equine Act does not define the terms "document" or "release." 
However, it is evident the term "release" refers to something more than a 
"document" which notifies the participant of the inherent risks associated with 
equine activities. As explained by the Court of Appeals, it would be inconsistent 
with established principles of statutory interpretation to read the terms "document" 
and "release" in section 203 as conveying the same meaning: 
We do not read the word 'release' in this section [section 203] to refer 
merely to a document notifying the participant that the sponsor is 
insulated against claims arising from certain inherent risks of 
participating in the activity. Because the statutory term 'document' 
already conveys this meaning, such a reading would impermissibly 
render 'release' redundant. See State v. Maestas, 2002 UT123, ^ 53, 
63P.3d62L 
Penunuri, 2011 UT App 183, 1 14. See also State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, \ 11, 
31 P.3d 547 ("[A]ny interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute 
inoperative or superfluous is to be avoided.") 
The ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "release" is "to give up in 
favor of another." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 987 (10th ed. 1999). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "release" as "the act of giving up a right or claim 
to the person against whom it could have been enforced." Black's Law Dictionary 
1202 (7th ed. 1999). In this case, the Court of Appeals noted, "[t]he main purpose 
of a release typically is the voluntary relinquishment of a claim or right by one 
who, absent the release, could have enforced such a claim or right." Penunuri, 
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2011 UT App 1834 14 (quoting 66 Am. Jur. 2d Releases § 1 (2010)). In this case, 
Penunuri could not "release" that which she did not have - a right to recover for 
injury caused by an "inherent risk." 
It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that courts "presume 
that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term 
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, If 16, 
137 P.3d 726. "Further, 'unambiguous language . . . may not be interpreted to 
contradict its plain meaning.'" Lorenzo v. Workforce Appeals Bd, 2002 UT App 
371,1 11, 58 P.3d 873 (quoting Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 
(Utah 1997)). "A corollary of this rule is that 'a statutory term should be 
interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the 
ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither unreasonably 
confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purposes of the 
statute.'" State v. Pixton, 2004 UT App 275, ^ 7, 98 P.3d 443 (quoting O'Keefe, 
956P.2dat281). 
The Legislature's use of the term "release" in section 203 indicates that it 
did not intent to prohibit the use of releases between equine activity sponsors and 
participants. If Penunuri were correct in arguing that the Legislature truly intended 
to void the use of releases, then certainly it would not have used language which 
expressly recognizes and authorizes their use. 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As the Court of Appeals observed, the Legislature's use of the term 
"release" in section 203 "presupposes the continued use of releases between equine 
activities sponsors and participants." Penunuri, 2011 UT App 183, \ 14. 
Realizing, perhaps, the prevalent use of releases in recreational activities, the 
Legislature chose to allow equine sponsors to incorporate the notice requirement of 
section 203 into their releases, which is exactly what Sundance did in this case.5 
There is simply nothing in the plain language of the Equine Act that prevents or 
restricts an equine activity sponsor, such as Sundance, from utilizing a release to 
protect itself contractually against claims of ordinary negligence. 
II. PENUNURI IDENTIFIES NO PUBLIC POLICY 
UNDERLYING THE EQUINE ACT THAT WOULD 
INVALIDATE THE USE OF A RELEASE. 
Penunuri next argues that the Release she signed is void because it violates 
the public policy of the Equine Act. Relying on this Court's decision in Rothstein 
v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, 175 P.3d 560, and its invalidation of a release 
under the Skiing Act, Penunuri asserts that the public policy of the Equine Act 
similarly requires the Release she signed be declared void. In support of her 
argument, Penunuri cites to legislative history and congressional floor debates, and 
claims that the Equine Act was intended to "parallel" the Skiing Act. (Appellants' 
5
 Sundance also posted a sign at its stable notifying participants of the "inherent 
risks." See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-203(2)(a). 
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Brf, p. 24.) While Sundance fully responds to Penunuri's arguments below, there 
are two preliminary points that must be considered. 
First, the legislative history of the Equine Act was never argued or presented 
to the trial court. It is well-settled that this Court will not address arguments raised 
for the first time on appeal. See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., 2003 
UT 23, T[ 19, 70 P.3d 904 (refusing to address new arguments raised for the first 
time on appeal). See also Ong Int'l v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 n.31 
(Utah 1993) ("Our concern is whether an argument was addressed in the first 
instance to the trial court. Failure to raise the point [below] precludes its 
consideration here.") (internal citations and quotations omitted; brackets original). 
Second, Penunuri's use of legislative history is improper where there has 
been no assertion that the plain language of the Equine Act is ambiguous. As 
previously noted, when interpreting a statute, courts look to the statute's plain 
language. See Dale T. Smith & Sons v. Utah Labor Comm% 2009 UT 19, 208 
P.3d 533, 534 ("When determining the meaning of a statute we first look to the 
words used by the Legislature, the statute's plain language.") It is only when the 
plain language of the statute is ambiguous that courts look to other sources. See 
Baby E.Z. v. T.I.Z., 2011 UT 38, ^  15, 266 P.3d 702 ("Unless we find ambiguity in 
a statute, we do not look to legislative history or public policy to try to glean the 
statute's intent.") See Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Servs., 2009 UT 54, % 9, 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
217 P.3d 716 ("We consult other sources only if the plain language of the statute is 
ambiguous.") 
Here, Penunuri has identified no ambiguity in the text of the Equine Act and 
agrees that its language is clear and unambiguous. Despite this, Penunuri attempts 
to use the legislative history to justify an interpretation of the Act which, as 
previously discussed, is unsupported by and directly contrary to its plain language. 
Penunuri's approach is exactly why this Court has instructed that caution be taken 
when considering public policy as a justification of judicial decisions. "Public 
policy is a vague and elastic term in need of limitation . . . ." Hodges v. Gibson 
Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 165 (Utah 1991). When attempting to extract public 
policy from statutory language, this Court has admonished: 
[I]n most instances, our proper role when confronted with a statute 
should be restricted to interpreting the meaning and application as 
revealed through its text. To pluck a principle of public policy from 
the text of a statute and to ground a decision of this court on that 
principle is to invite judicial mischief Like its cousin legislative 
history, public policy is a protean substance that is too often easily 
shaped to satisfy the preferences of a judge rather than the will of 
the people or the intentions of the Legislature. We aptly noted the 
risks of relying on public policy rationales when we stated that 'the 
theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague and variable 
quality, and, unless deducible in the given circumstances from 
constitutional or statutory provisions, should be accepted as a basis for 
judicial determinations, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection.' 
Rothstein, 2007 UT 96, f 10 (additional citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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A. The Court's decision in Rothstein and its analysis of the 
Skiing Act does not reveal a public policy prohibiting the 
use of releases under the Equine Act 
While Sundance does not dispute there being some similarities between the 
Skiing Act and the Equine Act, Penunuri's reliance on Rothstein and the Court's 
interpretation and application of the Skiing Act is misplaced. 
In Rothstein, the plaintiff sustained injuries when he collided with a 
retaining wall while skiing at Snowbird Ski Resort. 2007 UT 96, \ 1. Snowbird 
denied liability and claimed the skier had waived his ability to sue the resort for 
negligence when he purchased two ski passes that released the resort from liability 
for its ordinary negligence. In a subsequent lawsuit, the district court found the 
releases valid and dismissed the skier's claim for ordinary negligence against the 
resort. 
This Court reversed the district court's ruling, finding that the release 
violated public policy as declared in the Skiing Act. In its decision, the Court 
began by noting the general acceptance of releases and the general wariness of 
courts in relying on public policy rationales as a basis for judicial determinations. 
Id. at Yl 9-10. The Court observed that "no statute or other legislative 
pronouncement of public policy answers squarely the question of whether a 
preinjury release of a ski resort operator's negligence executed by a recreational 
skier is enforceable." Id. at f 11. However, the Court felt confident it could 
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properly define the public policy underlying the Skiing Act based on the 
Legislature's decision to enunciate that public policy and incorporate it directly 
into the text of the Act. In the introductory section of the Skiing Act, the 
Legislature articulated the following public policy: 
The Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by a large 
number of residents of Utah and attracts a large number of 
nonresidents, significantly contributing to the economy of this state. 
It further finds that few insurance carriers are willing to provide 
liability insurance protection to ski area operators and that the 
premiums charged by those carriers have risen sharply in recent years 
due to confusion as to whether a skier assumes the risks inherent in 
the sport of skiing. It is the purpose of this act, therefore, to clarify 
the law in relation to skiing injuries and the risks inherent in that 
sport, to establish as a matter of law that certain risks are inherent in 
that sport, and to provide that, as a matter of public policy, no person 
engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski operator for injuries 
resulting from those inherent risks. 
Rothstein, 2007 UT 96,112 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51). Based on this 
express statement of public policy, the Court was persuaded that the Legislature 
found it "necessary to immunize ski area operators from liability for injuries 
caused by inherent risks because they were otherwise being denied insurance 
coverage or finding coverage too expensive to purchase." Rothstein, 2007 UT 96, 
If 13. The Court went on to note that, in the absence of a "perceived insurance 
crisis," there was no evidence the Legislature would have "interceded" on behalf of 
the ski resorts in passing this legislation. See id. at ^ 15. 
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Demonstrating the importance of the express statement of public policy 
contained in the Skiing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51, this Court rejected case 
law cited by Snowbird from other jurisdictions that have, through statute, insulated 
providers of recreational activities from liability for inherent risks 0m/have upheld 
the use of releases, finding that none "contained] the kind of resounding public 
policy pronouncement present in Utah's [Skiing] Act." Rothstein, 2007 UT 96, f^ 
18.6 
Unlike the Skiing Act, the Equine Act contains no legislative findings or 
express statement of public policy, which was what this Court found so significant 
to its analysis in Rothstein and which ultimately formed the basis for its decision. 
See id. at Tf 13. Indeed, it was the "resounding public policy pronouncement" by 
the Legislature that has subsequently come to define the holding of Rothstein. Id. 
at U 18. See Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found, 2008 UT 13, [^15, 179 P.3d 760 ("In 
Rothstein, we relied on the legislature's statement of public policy in Utah's 
Inherent Risks of Skiing Act to conclude that a ski resort cannot enforce a 
preinjury release against a skier whose injuries may have resulted from the 
negligence of the ski resort.") The Court of Appeals found this fact alone 
sufficiently distinguished Rothstein from this case. See Penunuri, 2011 UT App 
6
 Rothstein was decided by a divided court (three to two), with the dissent 
expressing that "the majority's interpretation improperly expands the plain 
language of the [Skiing] Act and infuses it with 'intention not expressed' by the 
Legislature." 2007 UT 96, H 26. 
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183, Tf 19 (stating "[t]he Equine Act has no equivalent statement of public policy. 
In fact, it has no statement of public policy at all.") Further, the Court of Appeals 
rejected Penunuri's assertion that public policy could be determined from the 
language of the Equine Act, stating "Rothstein itself warns that '[t]o pluck a 
principle of public policy from the text of a statute and to ground a decision of this 
court on that principle is to invite judicial mischief.' Consequently, we decline to 
do so." Penunuri, 2011 UT App 183, f 19 (quoting Rothstein, 2007 UT 96,110). 
In addition to lacking a statement of public policy, there are other important 
distinctions between the Equine Act and the Skiing Act. This includes the fact that 
the public policy and the legislative findings expressed in the Skiing Act do not 
carry over to equine activities.7 Penunuri has presented no evidence in this case 
showing that horseback riding "significantly contributes] to the economy of this 
state" the same way skiing does. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51. For a state that 
has hosted the Winter Olympics and that boasts on its license plates having the 
"Greatest Snow on Earth," there can be no dispute - horseback riding occupies no 
7
 In fact, the public policy and legislative findings underlying the Skiing Act do not 
even carry over to all types of skiing activities. See Berry v. Greater Park City 
Co., 2007 UT 87, f 17; 171 P.3d 442 (upholding the enforcement of a release for a 
ski race and stating, "while the reach of the [Skiing] Act may extend to ski-related 
activities that fall outside the public policy consideration underlying the adoption 
of the [Skiing] Act, those activities, like skicross racing, are nevertheless subject to 
a separate analysis for the purpose of evaluating the enforceability of preinjury 
releases.") 
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space in the same realm of importance as skiing in Utah. Furthermore, unlike the 
Skiing Act, there is no evidence the Equine Act was bom out of a "perceived 
insurance crisis" that prompted the Legislature to urgently "intercede" on behalf of 
equine sponsors. See Rothstein, 2007 UT 96, ^ 15. Moreover, and perhaps most 
importantly, unlike the Equine Act, the Skiing Act contains no language expressly 
recognizing and authorizing the use of releases. As set forth above, the 
Legislature's use of the term "release" in section 203 of the Equine Act is 
significant, and demonstrates that it did not intend to prohibit equine activity 
sponsors from utilizing releases. 
B. The Legislative History of the Equine Act reveals no 
public policy or intent to prohibit the use of releases. 
Setting aside her failure to raise the argument before the trial court, 
Penunuri's analysis of the Equine Act's legislative history fails to uncover any 
public policy or legislative intent that would prohibit the use of releases between 
equine activity sponsors and participants. Penunuri places great emphasis on 
comments by some members of the Legislature discussing the similarities between 
the proposed Equine Act and the Skiing Act. However, rather than supporting 
Penunuri's position, the legislative history and floor debates actually undercut it. 
First, nowhere in the legislative history of the Equine Act is there any 
discussion signifying an intent by the Legislature to effect a change in existing law 
regarding the use of releases for non-inherent risks. The use of releases by 
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sponsors of recreational activities is commonplace in today's society and, in recent 
years, has been recognized and upheld on multiple occasions. See e.g., Pearce, 
2008 UT 13, Tf 15 (finding no public policy that would render unenforceable a 
release between a public bobsled ride operator and an adult bobsled rider); Berry, 
2007 UT 87, \ 15 ("[Utah's] public policy does not foreclose the opportunity of 
parties to bargain for the waiver of tort claims based on ordinary negligence."). If 
it was the intention of the Legislature to effect a dramatic change to this 
established practice, then one would expect there would be at least some discussion 
or mention of it during the legislative debates. Instead, there is none. See 
Penunuri, 2011 UT App 183, f 12, n.2 (noting that, like the text of the Equine Act, 
the legislative history cited by Penunuri does not even mention releases). 
Under what is known as the "barking dog" canon of statutory construction, 
courts refuse statutory interpretations that result in marked changes to existing law 
where there is no recognition or discussion in the legislative history of the statute 
having such an effect. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396, n. 23, 111 S. Ct. 
2354, 115 L. Ed 2d 348 (1991) ("[I]f Congress had such an intent, [it] would have 
made it explicit in the statute, or at least some of the Members would have 
identified or mentioned it at some point in the unusually extensive legislative 
history of the 1982 amendment.... Congress' silence in this regard can be likened 
to the dog that did not bark."); Church of Scientology v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 108 S. Ct. 
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J" I, ;>76, W 1. Fd :!(! "^ N (1<)X7) (Relinquish (' J I I All in all, we think this is a 
case where common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's 'dog 
that didn't bark,' that an amendment having the effect petitioner ascribes to it 
would have been differently descriKv ^n: . 
acteplt'it 'In, III fl'iNim manager of ll'ln hill ' I I llliib. rase, the legislative floor 
debates contain no reference to word "release" or to any intent by the Legislature 
tc override the ability <T parties (•> 'e.r.locate liability for non-inherent risks 
through contract. . . 
Second, IOIIMSUMII \illi I In: Ail's ftiaini lanpuaye, I he Hum debates reveal 
i; ic rv:rv>se and intent of the Act was to limit the liability of equine sponsors 
for the inherent risks associated with equine activities. At the same time, the 
Legislature wanted to make it clear that the Equine i \ ct woi lid not altei the stat i is 
ii||i!ii n l i i i u s p o J i i n i i . t l i i i i i ' I I H iniiii i n h r r c n i i r k V . ,-i1*t f o i t h i n mlln: till mi 
debates, the Act was intended to benefit equine sponsors by clarifying the law and 
declaring definitively that they would have no liability for inherent risks. T^:- ;s 
significant because Penunuri s interpretation and applicai 
iiitetil i if Ihr I ci'is'laluic on ils In/ad 
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Under the common law, equine sponsors were protected against liability 
from inherent risks under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk.8 "Primary 
assumption of the risk is the judicially created affirmative defense whereby a 
defendant owes no duty to protect a plaintiff against certain risks that are so 
inherent in an activity that they cannot be eliminated." Bundschu v. Naffah, 768 
N.E.2d 1215, 1221 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002). Primary assumption of risk "is an 
alternative expression for the proposition that defendant was not negligent, that is, 
there was no duty owed or there was no breach of an existing duty." Ghionis v. 
Deer Valley Resort Co., Ltd., 839 F. Supp. 789, 796 (D. Utah 1993) (applying Utah 
law); Lawson, 901 P.2d at 1016. 
In Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991), the court 
construed the Skiing Act and analyzed its correlation with the doctrine of primary 
Like many jurisdictions, Utah courts have recognized two types of assumption of 
risk, primary and secondary. "Primary" assumption of risk applies when a risk is 
"so inherent in an activity" that a duty cannot be imposed on the defendant to 
protect the plaintiff against it. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, 901 P.2d 1013, 1016 
(Utah 1995). On the other hand, the more common "secondary" assumption of risk 
is an affirmative defense to an established breach of a duty and is considered a 
form of contributory negligence. Id. at 1016 (quoting Jacobsen Constr. v. Structo-
Lite Eng'g, 619 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah 1980) (discussing secondary assumption of 
risk)). Due to confusion caused by the indiscriminate use of the phrase, 
"assumption of risk" terminology has been disapproved. However, the concept 
and principle behind the primary assumption of risk doctrine remains viable. See 
Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2007 UT 74, f 13, 171 P.3d 411 (stating "we do not violate 
principles of comparative negligence when we evaluate the presence or absence of 
duty under what had previously been denominated as primary assumption of the 
risk.") 
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assumption ol iisk AN sd lonl'li Am » , llu, Skiini! Ai I .mil Ihr 1 quint1 Ai il contain 
i!ii|inHlant ilistiihlions 1 lowr\'i^r (lie Clover court's analysis concerning the 
inherent risks of skiing and the doctrine of primary assumption of risk is helpful. 
The court observed that when ilu Skiing \ c t Tvn^ rn<^eH mc- najority - ; 
jurisdictions employed .U J o a n n e , i p: w..ai-. ay* ru * :;n 
resoi ts"'" s;< • > . { - , . . .. ,M • /u. ai IUTJ . iii^ 
< o ^xnbinedi 
Terms utilized in the [Skiing Act] such as 'inherent risk of skiing' and 
'assumes the risk' are the same terms relied upon in such [primary 
assumption of risk] cases This language suggests that the statute is 
meant to achieve the same result achieved under the doctrine of 
primary assumption of risk. In fact, commentators suggest that the 
statute was passed in reaction to a perceived erosion in the protect n 
ski area operators traditionally enjoyed under ilie common u \ \ 
doctrine of primary assumption of risk. 
M a t 1045-46. 
In this case, the kqume Act todities the common la<o lodiii urn, oil pniiiii.ii \ 
assumption ul i o.k U\ ahiiumii tiiy lliall ini i (|iniu: IU'IIMIN sponsor can be liable for 
the "inherent risks" associated with equine activities. However, just a- < ^aims for 
ordinary negligence would not be barred under the common law, such * •aims are 
negligcnu1 riml ilhci lot nil of rulpiihh' coiidiicl Inmi line protection afforded under 
Act. 
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If, prior to the Equine Act, equine sponsors were protected under the 
common law against liability for inherent risks and had the ability to utilize 
releases as a contractual protection against non-inherent risks, then it would make 
no sense for the Act to be applied in a way that provides equine sponsors with less 
protection then they had before the Act came into existence. See O'Keefe, 956 
P.2d at 281 (explaining that statutes must not be interpreted to result in an 
application that is "in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute"); 
B.L. Key v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(rejecting petitioner's statutory interpretation on the basis that it contradicts the 
purpose of the statute as expressed by the legislative history). Put another way, the 
Equine Act should not be construed so as to contradict the stated intent of the 
Legislature by placing equine sponsors in worse position then they were in before 
the Act was passed into law.9 
The legislative history of the Equine Act uncovers no public policy or intent 
that would prohibit equine sponsors from having the continued ability to protect 
themselves contractually against non-inherent risks.10 As a practical matter, the 
9
 The fact that, under Penunuri's argument, equine sponsors would be placed in 
worse position than they were in before the Act was passed also undercuts her 
claim that equine sponsors must not be allowed to utilize releases based on a 
"bargain" that was struck to give them protection against "inherent risks," as that 
protection already existed under the common law. (Appellants' Brf, p. 24.) 
10
 If accepted, Penunuri's interpretation and application of the Equine Act would 
call into question the validity of any release used in a host of other recreational 
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contra^ *.: . : *. •* ^ ^ ; -^- i : . \ w v ui me ease in 
vv hich a n i iiji ired participant may circumvent the protections equine sponsors are 
meant to enjoy against inherent risks. This case provides an excellent example. 
Penunurihas alleged that on tlu da> • t \uc au vk. - ^ i^* :i: • • r c « s 
r e p e a t e d l y ^ p ; - ^ .-• _ :ULV. • .. . j *. * • <* • • l 
the group 1\f ! S \ I IVniimiri 1 )rp p 1 II2.) Penunuri asserts that "[w]hen [her] 
horse rounded the bend it suddenly (and unexpectedly to Ms Penunuri) accelerated 
I* atch up with the heard. The unexpected acceleration caused \ ^ renunur- .> 
•o the ground." (Appellants ^h : :er;;nc. >h> ). 
;,. in •'•;!> -ition, ]'- / : =•• i>^n*n\1: 
n\ horse was stopped behind [Haley's], and w . Iv^e starv* 
going, and it was - u \\a& a rougher ride than I i emember ha\ HL< 
had before, other than, you know, with other grazing episodes m 
horse would, y ou know , kind of giddyup a little faster than, it had 
been going, because Haley's horse would start up and then mine 
would start up, too, and then - .'.t -N • * - • if at ,r 
particular incident, it seemed even rou^ln1*- han. \ou hnon, 
giddyup that I had gotten in other stop** Ana then I donyt 
remember anything until I was on the ground. 
activities. For instance, the Inherent Risks of Certain Recreational Activities Act 
provides protection against injuries and damages caused by the inherent risks 
associated with such activities as "a rodeo, an equestrian activity, skateboarding, 
skydiving, para gliding, hang gliding, roller skating, ice skating, fishing, hiking, 
walking, running, jogging, bike riding, or in-line skating . . . ." Utah Code Arm. § 
78B-4-509(l)(d). Like the Equine Act, the Recreational Activities Act specifically 
excludes liability for non-inherent risks from the scope of its protection. See id. at 
(3)(b). According to Penunuri, this would mean that any release for ordinary 
negligence would necessarily be invalid and unenforceable. 
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(R. 182, L. Penunuri Dep., pp. 114-15) (emphasis added). 
Under the Equine Act, "inherent risk" is defined as "those dangers or 
conditions which are an integral part of equine . . . activities, which may include: a. 
the propensity of [an] animal to behave in ways that may result in injury . . . [and] 
b. the unpredictability of [an] animal's reaction to outside stimulation such as . . . 
persons, or other animals." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201(5). Theoretically, 
Penunuri's claim should be barred because the sudden and unexpected acceleration 
of her horse, or as she describes it "rougher . . . giddyup," fits exactly within the 
Equine Act's definition of "inherent risk." To avoid having her claim barred by 
the Act, however, Penunuri has alleged that her horse's sudden and unexpected 
acceleration was not the result of an "inherent risk," but was instead the result of 
negligence on the part of the guide for allegedly allowing gaps to form between the 
riders. (Appellants' Brf, p. 4.) 
It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a participant injured during an 
equine activity could not easy articulate a theory of negligence to evade the 
protections equine activity sponsors are meant to enjoy against liability from 
inherent risks. If a participant is injured from being bitten or kicked by another 
horse on a group trail ride, one could argue that the equine sponsor was negligent 
for allowing the horses to get too close to one another. If a participant falls 
because their horse was spooked by a hiker or wild animal, one could argue that 
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ittc equ ine \()on\ui ua> negligent I'm liikmjj (he part hi ipanl mi .i trail open to h ike r s 
i i 111 ,m area inhabited by other animals. 
Realizing the ease with which an injury caused by an "inherent risk" may be 
transformed into a clai n r ' negligence is likely what cuuseu ;Lv \ 
ill this case to i ei : . • * ** • * ihi 
exception t 3 the Eq i line A ct" s coverage circumscribes its protections to the point of 
rendering them illusory." Pcniinuri, .*u| i TTT -\pp -^" r *~\: :; " For this reason, 
equine"" sponsors must have the ability to continue using releases and be able to i ely 
on them, as a contract ual deleti.se to claims :)foi dinai ) iiegl.igeii.ee. 
L. m e public policy most applicable in this case is the 
policy supporting freedom of contract. 
Utah appellate courts have long recognized that "people are generally free to 
bind themselves pursuant to any contract, nirrurj >'^:, ;mng> ^ t 
subject mau . . * . . ///'»./,/•.. *h-
* ' M \ See also Frailey v. McGarry, 211 P.2d 840, 847 ^.A: „ -.J, 
(s ta t ing •'..: ':ie Livv favors f*p * * " \xv . r full age and competent 
understanding to contraci necls • .,-IMH \ . ' . , . , . ~^ .... :^ -* T * 
•-' * u . •'. • y .\ - -itr s he 
maintained and that written contracts be the primary means by which this freedom 
is exercised) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Nullifying a contract on public policy grounds is a rarity under Utah law. 
Indeed, there are only a few instances in which the Legislature has found public 
policy sufficient to statutorily void otherwise valid and enforceable contracts. For 
instance, under Utah's Product Liability Act, the Legislature has declared that 
"[a]ny clause in a sales contract . . . that requires a purchaser or end user of a 
product to indemnify, hold harmless, or defend a manufacturer of a product is 
contrary to public policy and void and unenforceable . . . ." See Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-6-707. The Legislature has also declared void certain indemnification 
agreements in the construction industry as contrary to public policy. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-8-1. These examples suggest that when the Legislature enacts 
legislation intended to void particular types of contracts on grounds of public 
policy, it does so expressly. 
In this case, Penunuri was forty-eight years old when she signed the Release. 
(R. 249.) She testified that she signed the Release voluntarily and at no time did 
she ask for any clarification regarding any of the language in the Release. (R. 182, 
L. Penunuri Dep., pp. 129-30.) During her deposition, Penunuri testified that this 
was not her first experience signing a release and described signing similar releases 
at a rock climbing gym and for horseback riding lessons she took at an arena near 
her home in Phoenix, Arizona shortly before the accident. (R. 182, L. Penunuri 
Dep., pp. 64-65, 129.) As a matter of contract law, invalidating the Release 
33 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Penunuii signal wouM ivsull in iinpiedirlnhilih loi businesses like Sundance that 
ircl ' on the use of releases. As one court observed: 
If a prospective participant wishes to place himself in the competition 
suffi.cien.tly to voluntarily agree that he will not hold the organizer or 
sponsor of the event liable for his injuries, the courts should enforce 
such agreements. If these agreements, voluntarily entered into, were 
not upheld, the effect would be to increase the liability of those 
organizing or sponsoring such events to such an extent that no one 
would be willing to undertake to sponsor a sporting event. Clearly, 
this would not be in the public interest. 
Gore v. Tri-Coimty Raceway, Jnc . 40" F ^upp 480 (T>. \ L .•>'-!, v?t ah* : 
Johnson, Enforceabilu\ -.xcuipuion \ .\.,n<. • - /n/<>/*> tin\i\it\i\ M/ 
./",.• J i ^ ; recreational industries 
i • tt- :eindiii viable, Utah's framework for analyzing and enforcing exculpatory 
clauses should be consistently followed If the language of the exculpatory 
clause is: / 1 written clearly and is unwUNUiiiUa^ K : . ^c: .^. , .: 
*-. H> ^-'e, and (3) if the intent to relieve the provider of the activity from liability 
foi alleged negligence is clearly and iineqiiivocally expressed in the contractual 
provision, our courts should enforce I ha I piovisiuii. l ie 1 inn w. - * 
l u n i k 1 "I 
"For a contract to be void on the basis of public policy, there must be a 
showing free from doubt that the contract is against public policy." Ockey v. 
3 1 
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Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, |21 , 189 P.3d 51. Here, Penunuri has made no such 
showing, much less one free from doubt. 
III. AMICUS CURIAE RAISE ISSUES THAT EXTEND 
BEYOND THE QUESTION FOR WHICH CERTIORARI WAS 
GRANTED AND ASSERTS NEW ARGUMENTS INCLUDING 
SOME WHICH CONFLICT WITH THOSE MADE BY 
PENUNURI. 
This Court granted Penunuri's Petition for Certiorari on the following issue: 
Whether the court of appeals erred in construing the Limitations on 
Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-4-201, et seq., to permit releases of liability for ordinary 
negligence. 
The Court's certiorari order is clear and concise. While Penunuri and Sundance 
have limited their briefs to an analysis and discussion of the issue on review, the 
brief of amicus does not. Rather, amicus attempts to raise several new issues and 
arguments, including some that are directly contrary to those made by Penunuri. 
It is well-established that an amicus brief cannot extend or enlarge the issues 
on appeal. See Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629, n. 3 (Utah 1983) 
("Consistent with the well-settled rule that an amicus brief cannot extend or 
enlarge the issues on appeal, . . . we have only considered those portions of the 
amicus brief that bear on the issues pursued by the parties on this appeal."); In re 
Woodward, 384 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1963) ("Amicus curiae supports appellant's 
attack, but seeks to have the court canvass the constitutionality of a number of 
other sections, on the same and different constitutional grounds. We review only 
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-iv *i; • ,r >iiv ;. -i uiu^c r-\o ^ Grangers 
thereto . . . . , See also Praii v. Cu^i Trucking, inc., 228 Ca! \pp M i3M; W 
Ca" Rptr. ~3". "34 T .]. APT 10r>.r. '" m amicus curiae must accept the case as it 
finds it and :i\-. ; inei.v! • >e Tmrf caniu- ,il 
opedilion nl il'. no mi iiini'clalol Ui tha n hi,ml ippellatr inonl ' ; 
j n | i e r arguments to this Court and the Court of Appeals, Penunuri attacks 
the validity of the Release she signed based on the language of the Equine Act and 
what "he consider^ ^ be fhe pub^V nolirv underlying .. . 
legishr : * ^  - i - • ' • * ; . \ • instead 
moi ints an attack against all recreational releases, not just those relating to equine 
activities. A micus asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in this case by "fail[ing] 
to engage \u a ihorough public policy analysis due to the lack of" an express 
legisia m M,-C x / M • **l • ' . : • • 
uiai we y]s <\:m&t thu enforcemeni oi xecreational releases. (See 
Amicus Bi 1 at r 5 ) Specifically, amicus argues that recreational releases violate 
the public policy oi I he petition clause and open courts clause . 
Omsliluti i I'Vv /(/ Jit p| ' " ' \ * mi. a . also ipriias 'ha1 racrca1io,,,i|1 tvlrasas 
are contrary '- li-a ucneral public p* !'r\ oi" tort law and that allowing "for-profit 
business" to immunize themselves against negligence "promotes lie societal 
benefits." (See id at pp. 1 > IK) Nol only do these arguments go beyond the issue 
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for which certiorari was granted, they go far beyond the issues raised by Penunuri 
or otherwise preserved for appeal.11 
Amicus further argues that the Release signed by Penunuri is overly broad 
and "offends notions of public good." (See id. at p. 19.) Focusing on the language 
of the Release, amicus claims that it is too broad to be enforceable. (See id.) 
Again, this argument goes beyond the issue presented for review and was never 
raised or preserved below. 
The last argument raised by amicus asserts that the Release signed by 
Penunuri is contrary to the public interest. Amicus' argument is curious in that it 
acknowledges but ignores this Court's holding in Pearce, 2008 UT 13, Tf 14, which 
found that "recreational activities do not constitute a public interest and that, 
therefore, preinjury releases for recreational activities cannot be invalidated under 
the public interest exception." (See Amicus Brf, p. 20.) Relying on the public 
interest factors articulated in the case Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 
2d 92, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963), and two cases from 
outside jurisdictions applying the same, Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 16 P.3d 
1098 (N.M. 2003) and Reardon v. Windswept Farm, LLC, 905 A.2d 1156, 1162 
Amicus also makes no effort to reconcile its assault on recreational releases with 
the recent decisions by this Court upholding their use in Berry, 2007 UT 78 and 
Pearce, 2008 UT 13, except to say that horseback riding "involves a much milder 
activity" than ski racing and bobsledding. (See Amicus Brf. at p. 23.) 
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(I Dim. 200M amicus argms that Ihe Release suincif h\ IVnm in is void because it 
\ a lales the public interest. 
In addition to again being beyond the issue for which certiorari was granted, 
amicus' argument concerning the p.. * r IUCM K. K > , w n u a u ] ^ _ n-
taken by Penunui i in this case. • • • • i mi. . ^:\>e; 
sluled ""(i'lln (his instance Ms Penunuri agrees with Sundance that horseback 
riding, just like skiing, is a recreational activity and is non-essential and therefore it 
certainly docs not violate the Public Interest Exception t.\ppei;am o:. ; 
Appeals Rep ;> .;,. , emphasis orign -i r ; o » s . 
P r i i i • •. . *'r i^ - 'olaied uie public interest exception 
and has also made no claim that the release was ambiguous." (See id, at p 6.) See 
also Penunuri, 2011 UT App 183, f 15, n. 4 (noting "Penunuri does not argue that 
the Release \ iolates public policy under the so-called TttuLi standard ' I • 
\s demonstrated ubosr llir I mud* tiled by amicus goes beyond the issue for 
which certiorari was granted and the arguments raised by Penunuri in this case 
Because it is well-established that amicus, a stranger to the case,, cannot extend or 
enlarge the issues on appeal, Sundance has noil addu ssed (best; new i-.stii iiinlll 
ai guments 'h £ idsei i, 658 P 2d at 629 n 3 I lowever, should the Court desire for 
Sundance to respond to the issues and argument raised h, amicus, Sundance 
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respectfully requests that the Court so indicate and grant it leave to submit 
additional briefing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Sundance requests that the Court affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision finding 
the Release signed by Penunuri valid and enforceable against her ordinary 
negligence-based claims. 
DATED this Z jL day of March, 2012. 
STRONG & HANNI 
H. Bi^Jo^gwood 
A. Joseph Sano 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. 
Case No. 20100331-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2011 UTApp 183; 684 Utah Adv. Rep. 30; 2011 Utah App. LEXIS 189 
June 9,2011, Filed 
NOTICE: 
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BE-
FORE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORT-
ER. 
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] 
Fourth District, Provo Department, 080400019. The 
Honorable Claudia Laycock. 
COUNSEL: Robert D. Strieper, Salt Lake City, for Ap-
pellants. 
H. Burt Ringwood and A. Joseph Sano, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellees. 
JUDGES: J. Frederic Voros Jr., Judge. WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Presiding Judge, Michele M. Christian-
sen, Judge. 
OPINION BY: J. Frederic Voros Jr. 
OPINION 
VOROS, Judge: 
[*P1] Lisa Penunuri appeals the trial court's order 
denying her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
against Sundance Partners, LTD, and other named ap-
pellees (collectively, Sundance) and dismissing as a 
matter of law her claims based on ordinary negligence. 
We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] On August 1, 2007, Penunuri and two 
friends participated in a guided horseback ride operated 
by Sundance. The party consisted of five riders and one 
guide. The riders were arrayed in single file with the 
guide in front and Penunuri in the rear. The rider directly 
in front of Penunuri was an eight-year-old girl. The girl 
had problems controlling her horse; as a result, gaps 
formed in the train of riders. To keep the train together, 
the guide informed the riders that she would hold the 
reins of the eight-year-old's horse. However, before the 
guide could do so, Penunuri's horse suddenly accelerated 
[**2] to catch up with the other horses. The unexpected 
acceleration allegedly caused' Penunuri to fall off her 
horse and suffer serious injuries. Sundance's instructional 
manual for horseback riding guides cautioned that horses 
that lag behind tend to accelerate quickly to catch up 
with the group. 
[*P3] Before participating in the ride, Penunuri 
signed a Release & Indemnity Agreement (the Release), 
which purported to release Sundance from any claims 
arising from its ordinary negligence: 
I expressly agree to assume all risks of 
personal injury, falls, accidents, and/or 
property damage, including those result-
ing from any negligence of Sundance . . . . 
[*P4] Penunuri filed suit against Sundance alleg-
ing negligence, gross negligence, and vicarious liability. 
She then filed a Motion and Memorandum for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Declaratory Relief, arguing that 
the Release is unenforceable under the Limitations on 
Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act (the 
Equine Act), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-4-201 to -203 
(2008). The trial court ruled that the Equine Act did not 
prevent a party from contracting away its liability for 
ordinary negligence and thus ruled the Release enforcea-
ble. It accordingly [**3] dismissed all of Penunuri's 
claims batsed on ordinary negligence. Penunuri appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[*P5] Penunuri contends that the trial court erred 
by denying her motion for partial summary judgment and 
by ruling that the Release was enforceable. More specif-
ically, she argues that the plain language of the Equine 
Act prevents an equine sponsor from limiting its liability 
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for ordinary negligence with a pre-injury release. In ad-
dition, she argues that public policy as expressed in the 
Equine Act prohibits such releases. 
[*P6] Summary judgment is appropriate where 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We "review[] a trial court's 
legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of sum-
mary judgment for correctness and view[] the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party." Bingham v. 
Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37, \ 10, 235 P.3d 730. 
In addition, "[w]e review questions of statutory interpre-
tation for correctness giving no deference to the trial 
court's interpretation." In re S.C., 1999 UT App 251, \ 8, 
987 P.2d 611 [**4] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
[*P7] "In general, the common law disfavors 
agreements that indemnify parties against their own neg-
ligence because one might be careless of another's life 
and limb, if there is no penalty for carelessness." Haw-
kins v. Peart, 2001 UT 94, K 14, 37 P.3d 1062 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, generally, "those 
who are not engaged in public service may properly bar-
gain against liability for harm caused by their ordinary 
negligence in performance of [a] contractual duty; but 
such an exemption is always invalid if it applies to harm 
wilfully inflicted or caused by gross or wanton negli-
gence." Id. \ 9 (quoting 6A Arthur Linton Corbin, Cor-
bin on Contracts, § 1472, at 596-97 (1962)). Thus, in 
Utah, as in a majority of states, generally "people may 
contract away their rights to recover in tort for damages 
caused by the ordinary negligence of others." Pearce v. 
Utah Athletic Found, 2008 UT 13, If 14, 179 P.3d 760] 
see also Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, \ 6, 
175 P.3d 560 ("We have joined the majority of jurisdic-
tions in permitting people to surrender their rights to 
recover in tort for the negligence of others."). 
[*P8] Penunuri first contends [**5] that the plain 
language of the Equine Act renders the Release unenfor-
ceable. She also contends that the Release offends public 
policy established by the Equine Act. We consider each 
contention in turn. 
A. The Language of the Equine Act Does Not Inva-
lidate the Release. 
[*P9] "To interpret a statute, we always look first 
to the statute's plain language in an effort to give effect to 
the legislature's intent, to the degree it can be so dis-
cerned." In re Olympus Constr., LC, 2009 UT 29, \ 10, 
215 P.3d 129. To determine the meaning of the plain 
language, we examine the statute "in harmony with other 
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." LP I 
Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, \ 11, 215 P.3d 135 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, '"effect must be 
given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of 
a statute . . . . No clausef,] sentence or word shall be con-
strued as superfluous, void or insignificant if the con-
struction can be found which will give force to and pre-
serve all the words of the statute.'" State v. Maestas, 
2002 UT 123, \ 53, 63 P.3d 621 (omission and alteration 
in original) (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction § 46:06 [**6] (4th ed. 1984)). 
[*P10] Penunuri contends that the Release vi-
olates the express terms of the Equine Act. Section 202 
of the Equine Act shields an equine sponsor from liabili-
ty for the inherent risks associated with equine activities, 
unless the sponsor engages in negligence, gross negli-
gence, willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the 
participant, or intentionally injurious conduct: 
An equine activity sponsor, equine 
professional, livestock activity sponsor, or 
livestock professional is not liable for an 
injury to or the death of a participant due 
to the inherent risks associated with these 
activities, unless the sponsor or profes-
sional: 
(a)(i) provided the 
equipment or tack; 
(ii) the equipment or 
tack caused the injury; and 
(iii) the equipment 
failure was due to the 
sponsor's or professional's 
negligence; 
(b) failed to make 
reasonable efforts to de-
termine whether the equine 
or livestock could behave 
in a manner consistent with 
the activity with the par-
ticipant; 
(c) owns, leases, rents, 
or is in legal possession 
and control of land or fa-
cilities upon which the par-
ticipant sustained injuries 
because of a dangerous 
condition which was 
known to or should have 
been known to the sponsor 
or professional [**7] and 
for which warning signs 
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have not been conspi-
cuously posted; 
(d)(i) commits an act 
or omission that constitutes 
negligence, gross negli-
gence, or willful or wanton 
disregard for the safety of 
the participant; and 
(ii) that act or omis-
sion causes the injury; or 
(e) intentionally in-
jures or causes the injury to 
the participant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202(2) (2008) (emphasis add-
ed).1 
1 This section was renumbered and amended 
after the instant case arose, but the relevant por-
tions have not changed. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-4-202 amend, notes (2008). We cite to the 
current version of the statute for the reader's con-
venience. 
[*P11] Penunuri argues that the "plain language 
provides that [Sundance] is not to be held liable for in-
herent risks associated with equine activity yet must be 
held liable for its acts or omissions of negligence." (Em-
phasis added.) She further argues that enforcing the Re-
lease "would make everything after 'unless' in [section 
202(2)] superfluous." Sundance responds that while the 
Act is designed to ensure that equine activity sponsors 
would not be liable for specified inherent risks, "nothing 
in the Act suggests that the Legislature intended to 
change or alter the liability of [**8] equine sponsors for 
noninherent risks or the contractual protections that 
might be afforded to them through a release." As noted 
above, Utah case law recognizes that pre-injury releases 
releasing a party from liability for its own negligence are 
generally enforceable. Thus, in effect, Penunuri asks us 
to read section 202 to overrule that case law insofar as 
equine and livestock activities are concerned. 
[*P12] The principal obstacle to reading section 
202 to invalidate pre-injury releases is that it does not 
mention releases.2 Accordingly, if section 202 invalidates 
pre-injury releases, it does so by implication only. As it 
applies to this case, section 202 is clear that an equine 
activity sponsor is protected from liability for the injury 
or death of a participant due to the inherent risks of 
equine activity unless the sponsor is negligent, grossly 
negligent, or worse. But what then? According to Penu-
nuri, once negligence is established, the Equine Act 
mandates liability, subject only to statutory defenses. 
According to Sundance, once negligence is established, 
the Equine Act ceases to apply, and the case becomes a 
garden variety negligence case controlled by the rules 
governing such cases, [**9] including common law 
defenses. 
2 The same is true of the legislative history to 
which Penunuri directs our attention. 
[*P13] Reading this language to abrogate com-
mon law defenses, invalidate pre-injury releases, and 
mandate liability stretches the statutory language past its 
plain meaning. We agree with Sundance and the trial 
court that section 202 protects a sponsor from liability 
arising from the inherent risks of equine activities unless 
the sponsor is negligent, in which case it offers no pro-
tection. However, the sponsor remains free to assert all 
other applicable defenses, including, if appropriate, re-
lease. The "unless" clause thus defines the limit of the 
Act's benefits to sponsors; it does not impose new bur-
dens upon them. The Equine Act therefore leaves undis-
turbed case law permitting sponsors to contractually limit 
their liability for acts of ordinary negligence. See gener-
ally Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 904 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Generally, parties ... may prop-
erly bargain against liability from harm caused by their 
ordinary negligence."). This reading does not render the 
language following "unless" superfluous, as Penunuri 
argues. That language is still given its [**10] desired 
effect, which is to circumscribe the protections offered 
by the Equine Act.3 
3 Because our supreme court has de-
clined-albeit in a noncommercial setting-to "ex-
tend strict liability to owners and keepers of 
horses," see Pullan v. Steinmetz, 2000 UT 103, f 
7, 16 P. 3d 1245, one might question whether the 
negligence exception to the Equine Act's cover-
age circumscribes its protections to the point of 
rendering them illusory. 
[*P14] Thus construed, section 202 is in harmony 
with section 203 of the Equine Act. See LPI Servs. v. 
McGee, 2009 UT 41, If 11, 215 P.3d 135 (stating that 
statutes are to be read in harmony with other statutes in 
the same chapter). Section 203 requires equine or lives-
tock activity sponsors to provide notice to participants 
that the sponsor is not liable for certain inherent risks of 
the equine activity. See Utah Code Ann. § 788-4-203(1) 
(2008). This notice may be provided by posting a sign in 
a prominent location or by "providing a document or 
release for the participant . . . to sign." Id. § 
78B-4-203(2)(b) (emphasis added). We do not read the 
word "release" in this section to refer merely to a docu-
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ment notifying the participant that the sponsor is insu-
lated against [**11] claims arising from certain inherent 
risks of participating in the activity. Because the statuto-
ry term "document" already conveys this meaning, such 
a reading would impermissibly render "release" redun-
dant. See State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ 53, 63 P.3d 
621. Furthermore, a release does more than provide no-
tice. "The main purpose of a release typically is the vo-
luntary relinquishment of a claim or right by one who, 
absent the release, could have enforced such a claim or 
right." 66 Am. Jur. 2d Releases § 1 (2010). We therefore 
conclude that section 203 presupposes the continued use 
of releases between equine activity sponsors and partici-
pants. Given the other provisions of the statute, a release 
in this context can have only one purpose, which is to 
release in advance a sponsor from liability for that spon-
sor's ordinary negligence. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the plain language of the Equine Act does not invalidate 
the Release. 
B. Public Policy as Expressed in the Equine Act Does 
Not Invalidate the Release. 
[*P15] Penunuri next contends that the Release 
violates public policy as expressed in the Equine Act.4 It 
is well settled that "preinjury releases must be compati-
ble with public policy." [**12] Pearce v. Utah Athletic 
Found, 2008 UT 13, U 15, 179 P3d 760. However, we 
proceed with great caution when considering whether to 
invoke public policy as a basis for judicial determina-
tions: 
[P]ublic policy is a protean substance 
that is too often easily shaped to satisfy 
the preferences of a judge rather than the 
will of the people or the intentions of the 
Legislature . . . . [T]he theory of public 
policy embodies a doctrine of vague and 
variable quality, and, unless deducible in 
the given circumstances from constitu-
tional or statutory provisions, should be 
accepted as a basis for judicial determina-
tions, if at all, only with the utmost cir-
cumspection. 
Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT96,^ 10, 175 P.3d 
560 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fairfield 
Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, LP, 246 S W.3d 653, 
672 (Tex. 2008) ("[PJublic policy ... is a very unruly 
horse, and when once you get astride it you never know 
where it will carry you." (quoting Richardson v. Mellish, 
(1824) 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303)). "For 
a contract to be void on the basis of public policy, there 
must be a showing free from doubt that a contract is 
against public policy." Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, Tf 
21, 189 P.3d 51 [**13] (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
4 Penunuri does not argue that the Release vi-
olates public policy under the so-called Tunkl 
standard. See generally Hawkins v. Peart, 2001 
UT 94, \9 n.3, 37 P.3d 1062 (discussing the 
public policy standard set forth in Tunkl v. Re-
gents of the University of California, 60 Cal. 2d 
92, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 
1963)). 
[*P116] Generally, "our public policy does not fo-
reclose the opportunity of parties to bargain for the 
waiver of tort claims based on ordinary negligence." 
Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, f 15, 171 
P.3d 442. However, Penunuri argues that the Equine Act 
establishes a public policy prohibiting an equine sponsor 
from limiting its liability for negligence via a pre-injury 
release. She analogizes to the Utah Supreme Court's in-
validation of a pre-injury release based on public policy 
grounds under Utah's Inherent Risks of Skiing Act (the 
Skiing Act). See generally Rothstein, 2007 UT 96, 175 
P.3d 560; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-51 to -54 (2002 & 
Supp. 2007). 
[*P17] In Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 
96, 175 P.3d 560, a skier collided with a retaining wall 
and was injured. See id ^ /. He sued the ski resort, alleg-
ing negligence. See id. The trial court granted the ski 
resort's [**14] motion for summary judgment based on 
two release and indemnity agreements signed by the 
skier. See id. % 5. The agreements provided that the skier 
waived all claims, "including those caused by [the 
resort's] negligence." Id. U 4. The supreme court reversed 
in a 3-2 decision, holding that the releases violated pub-
lic policy as declared in the Skiing Act. See id. ^ 1. 
[*P18] The first section of the Skiing Act contains 
an extensive statement of its public policy underpin-
nings: 
"The Legislature finds that the sport of 
skiing is practiced by a large number of 
residents of Utah and attracts a large 
number of nonresidents, significantly 
contributing to the economy of this state. 
It further finds that few insurance carriers 
are willing to provide liability insurance 
protection to ski area operators and that 
the premiums charged by those carriers 
have risen sharply in recent years due to 
confusion as to whether a skier assumes 
the risks inherent in the sport of skiing. It 
is the purpose of this act, therefore, to cla-
rify the law in relation to skiing injuries 
and the risks inherent in that sport, to es-
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tablish as a matter of law that certain risks 
are inherent in that sport, and to provide 
that, as [**15] a matter of public policy, 
no person engaged in that sport shall re-
cover from a ski operator for injuries re-
sulting from those inherent risks." 
Id. U 12 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51 (2002 & 
Supp. 2007)). Based on that public policy statement, the 
Rothstein court observed that the Legislature found it 
"necessary to immunize ski area operators from liability 
for injuries caused by inherent risks because they were 
otherwise being denied insurance coverage or finding 
coverage too expensive to purchase." Id. \ 14. The court 
thus reasoned that "[t]he central purpose of the [Skiing] 
Act ... was to permit ski area operators to purchase in-
surance at affordable rates." Id. U 15. A public policy 
"bargain [was] struck by the [Skiing] Act," the court 
held, which provided that "ski area operators would be 
freed from liability for inherent risks of skiing so that 
they could continue to shoulder responsibility for nonin-
herent risks by purchasing insurance." Id. f 16. Because 
the purpose of the Skiing Act was to provide ski resorts 
with the ability to purchase affordable liability insurance, 
the court held that the Legislature had determined that 
ski resorts could not "use pre-injury releases [**16] to 
significantly pare back or even eliminate their need to 
purchase the very liability insurance the [Skiing] Act was 
designed to make affordable." Id. Accordingly, the court 
held that the releases offended public policy. See id. 
[*P19] Penunuri argues that the Equine Act "was 
intended to mirror" the Skiing Act and that the two acts 
are "nearly identical." She argues, therefore, that the 
Equine Act struck the same bargain as the Skiing Act 
and thus prohibits pre-injury releases for negligence. 
Penunuri points out that both statutes "limit participants 
from recovering from inherent risks of the sport. Both 
define the inherent risks as those that are integral to the 
sport. Both acts require that the operator or sponsor post 
a sign listing the inherent risks. Both acts permit a par-
ticipant to recover from acts of the sponsor or operator's 
negligence." Notwithstanding those similarities, howev-
er, only the Skiing Act includes a declaration of public 
policy. That public policy declaration was the center-
piece of Rothstein. From it, the supreme court gleaned 
"[t]he central purpose of the [Skiing] Act," id ^ 15, and 
extrapolated "the bargain struck by the [Skiing] Act," id 
\ 16, which supported its [**17] ultimate holding that 
Snowbird's releases were invalid. See id. "Few legislative 
expressions of public policy speak more clearly to an 
issue," the court noted, "than the public policy rationale 
for Utah's ... Skiing Act speaks to preinjury releases for 
negligence." Id 1} 11. The Equine Act has no equivalent 
statement of public policy. In fact, it has no statement of 
public policy at all. We are instead left with only the text 
of the Equine Act from which to deduce a public policy. 
Rothstein itself warns that "[t]o pluck a principle of pub-
lic policy from the text of a statute and to ground a deci-
sion of this court on that principle is to invite judicial 
mischief." Id^ 10. Consequently, we decline to do so.5 
5 In Street v. Darwin Ranch, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 
2d 1296 (D.C. Wyo. 1999), a rider suing a dude 
ranch for a fall from a horse on a trail ride sought 
to invalidate a pre-injury release based on the 
Wyoming Recreation Safety Act. See id. at 1297. 
Similar to the Equine Act, the Wyoming 
Recreation Safety Act shields providers of recre-
ational activities from claims based on the inhe-
rent risks of those activities. See id. (citing Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123 (1999)). The court con-
cluded, "The [**18] Release is, at the very least, 
consistent with the public policy expressed by the 
Act, if not in furtherance of it." Id. at 1300-01. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P20] The plain language of the Equine Act pro-
vides statutory protection to equine sponsors for inherent 
risks of equine activities. The portion of the Equine Act 
excluding negligent, gross negligent, and intentional acts 
from its protection does not invalidate pre-injury releases 
of ordinary negligence. In addition, while the Equine Act 
and the Skiing Act share a number of similarities, only 
the latter features a declaration of public policy. Accor-
dingly, while the supreme court in Rothstein had a basis 
in the Skiing Act to invalidate pre-injury releases, we see 
no equivalent basis in the Equine Act for doing the same. 
[*P21] Affirmed. 
J. Frederic Voros Jr., Judge 
[*P22] WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, 
Presiding Judge 
Michele M. Christiansen, Judge 
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TITLE 78B. JUDICIAL CODE 
CHAPTER 4. LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY 
PART 2. LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY FOR EQUINE AND LIVESTOCK ACTIVITIES 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201 (2011) 
§78B-4-201. Definitions 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Equine" means any member of the equidae family. 
(2) "Equine activity" means: 
(a) equine shows, fairs, competitions, performances, racing, sales, or parades that involve any breeds of 
equines and any equine disciplines, including dressage, hunter and jumper horse shows, grand prix jumping, mul-
tiple-day events, combined training, rodeos, driving, pulling, cutting, polo, steeple chasing, hunting, endurance trail 
riding, and western games; 
(b) boarding or training equines; 
(c) teaching persons equestrian skills; 
(d) riding, inspecting, or evaluating an equine owned by another person regardless of whether the owner 
receives monetary or other valuable consideration; 
(e) riding, inspecting, or evaluating an equine by a prospective purchaser; or 
(f) other equine activities of any type including rides, trips, hunts, or informal or spontaneous activities spon-
sored by an equine activity sponsor. 
(3) "Equine activity sponsor" means an individual, group, governmental entity, club, partnership, or corporation, 
whether operating for profit or as a nonprofit entity, which sponsors, organizes, or provides facilities for an equine ac-
tivity, including: 
(a) pony clubs, hunt clubs, riding clubs, 4-H programs, therapeutic riding programs, and public and private 
schools and postsecondary educational institutions that sponsor equine activities; and 
(b) operators, instructors, and promoters of equine facilities, stables, clubhouses, ponyride strings, fairs, and 
arenas. 
(4) "Equine professional" means a person compensated for an equine activity by: 
(a) instructing a participant; 
(b) renting to a participant an equine to ride, drive, or be a passenger upon the equine; or 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201 
(c) renting equine equipment or tack to a participant. 
(5) "Inherent risk" with regard to equine or livestock activities means those dangers or conditions which are an 
integral part of equine or livestock activities, which may include: 
(a) the propensity of the animal to behave in ways that may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or 
around them; 
(b) the unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside stimulation such as sounds, sudden movement, and 
unfamiliar objects, persons, or other animals; 
(c) collisions with other animals or objects; or 
(d) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or 
others, such as failing to maintain control over the animal or not acting within his or her ability. 
(6) "Livestock" means all domesticated animals used in the production of food, fiber, or livestock activities. 
(7) "Livestock activity" means: 
(a) livestock shows, fairs, competitions, performances, packing events, or parades or rodeos that involve any 
or all breeds of livestock; 
(b) using livestock to pull carts or to carry packs or other items; 
(c) using livestock to pull travois-type carriers during rescue or emergency situations; 
(d) livestock training or teaching activities or both; 
(e) taking livestock on public relations trips or visits to schools or nursing homes; 
(f) boarding livestock; 
(g) riding, inspecting, or evaluating any livestock belonging to another, whether or not the owner has received 
some monetary consideration or other thing of value for the use of the livestock or is permitting a prospective purchaser 
of the livestock to ride, inspect, or evaluate the livestock; 
(h) using livestock in wool production; 
(i) rides, trips, or other livestock activities of any type however informal or impromptu that are sponsored by 
a livestock activity sponsor; and 
(j) trimming the feet of any livestock. 
(8) "Livestock activity sponsor" means an individual, group, governmental entity, club, partnership, or corpora-
tion, whether operating for profit or as a nonprofit entity, which sponsors, organizes, or provides facilities for a lives-
tock activity, including: 
(a) livestock clubs, 4-H programs, therapeutic riding programs, and public and private schools and postse-
condary educational institutions that sponsor livestock activities; and 
(b) operators, instructors, and promoters of livestock facilities;, stables, clubhouses, fairs, and arenas. 
(9) "Livestock professional" means a person compensated for a livestock activity by: 
(a) instructing a participant; 
(b) renting to a participant any livestock for the purpose of riding, driving, or being a passenger upon the li-
vestock; or 
(c) renting livestock equipment or tack to a participant. 
(10) "Participant" means any person, whether amateur or professional, who directly engages in an equine activi-
ty or livestock activity, regardless of whether a fee has been paid to participate. 
(11) (a) "Person engaged in an equine or livestock activity" means a person who rides, trains, leads, drives, or 
works with an equine or livestock, respectively. 
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(b) Subsection (1 l)(a) does not include a spectator at an equine or livestock activity or a participant at an 
equine or livestock activity who does not ride, train, lead, or drive an equine or any livestock. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-27b-101, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 126, § 1; 1999, ch. 257, § 1; 2003, ch. 175, § 1; renumbered 
by L. 2008, ch. 3, §741. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202 (2011) 
§ 78B-4-202. Equine and livestock activity liability limitations 
(1) It shall be presumed that participants in equine or livestock activities are aware of and understand that there are 
inherent risks associated with these activities. 
(2) An equine activity sponsor, equine professional, livestock activity sponsor, or livestock professional is not liable 
for an injury to or the death of a participant due to the inherent risks associated with these activities, unless the sponsor 
or professional: 
(a) (i) provided the equipment or tack; 
(ii) the equipment or tack caused the injury; and 
(iii) the equipment failure was due to the sponsor's or professional's negligence; 
(b) failed to make reasonable efforts to determine whether the equine or livestock could behave in a manner 
consistent with the activity with the participant; 
(c) owns, leases, rents, or is in legal possession and control of land or facilities upon which the participant sus-
tained injuries because of a dangerous condition which was known to or should have been known to the sponsor or pro-
fessional and for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted; 
(d) (i) commits an act or omission that constitutes negligence, gross negligence, or willful or wanton disregard 
for the safety of the participant; and 
(ii) that act or omission causes the injury; or 
(e) intentionally injures or causes the injury to the participant. 
(3) This chapter does not prevent or limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, a lives-
tock activity sponsor, or a livestock professional who is: 
(a) a veterinarian licensed under Title 58, Chapter 28, Veterinary Practice Act, in an action to recover for dam-
ages incurred in the course of providing professional treatment of an equine; 
(b) liable under Title 4, Chapter 25, Estrays and Trespassing Animals; or 
(c) liable under Title 78B, Chapter 7, Utah Product Liability Act. 
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Utah Code Ann § 78B-4-203 (2011) 
§ 78B \ -203. Signs to be posted listing inherent risks and liability limitations 
(1) An equine or livestock activity sponsor shall provide notice to participants of the equine or livestock activity that 
there are inherent risks of participating and that the sponsor is not liable for certain of those risks. 
(2) Notice shall be provided by: 
(a) posting a sign in a prominent location within the area being used for the activity; or 
(b) providing a document or release for the participant, or the participant's legal guardian if the participant is a 
minor, to sign. 
(3) The notice provided by the sign or document shall be sufficient if it includes the iefmiti :»ii of inhei eriil: i isli ;: in 
Section 78B-4-201 and states that the sponsor is not liable for those inherent risks. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), signs are not required to be posted for parades and activities that fall within 
Subsections 78B-4-2Ol(2)(0 and (7)(c), (e), (g), (h), and (j). 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-27b-103, enacted by L 2003, ch. 175, § 3; renumbered by L. 2008, ch. 3, § 743. 
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